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Abstract—Data geolocation in the cloud is becoming an
increasingly pressing problem, aggravated by incompatible legis-
lation in different jurisdictions and compliance requirements of
data owners. In this work we present a mechanism allowing cloud
users to control the geographical location of their data, stored
or processed in plaintext on the premises of Infrastructure-as-a-
Service cloud providers. We use trusted computing principles and
remote attestation to establish platform state. We enable cloud
users to confine plaintext data exclusively to the jurisdictions
they specify, by sealing decryption keys used to obtain plaintext
data to the combination of cloud host geolocation and platform
state. We provide a detailed description of the implementation
as well as performance measurements on an open source cloud
infrastructure platform using commodity hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliance on third-party providers for cloud storage and
computing decouples data management from both data own-
ership and responsibility for correct data usage. A data owner
loses control over the geographical placement of data once it is
transferred to a cloud provider and earlier agreements become
the only available tool to manage future data placement. In
some cases, transfer of sensitive data to other countries is
illegal and while agreements can be a basis for compensation,
they can only help post factum, when the damage is already
done.
The physical location of data storage and processing in
cloud environments matters for several reasons: tax rates may
differ based on where a transaction is conducted (rather than
where the entity is registered); compliance rules or privacy
laws may require that certain categories of data are not stored
or processed in a different jurisdiction; finally, organizations
with geographically distributed field offices might conduct
operations – such as certain types research – which are illegal
in some countries (e.g. stem cell research [1]). The above
reasons are relevant to both data processing and storage. In [2],
the authors clarify the importance of geolocation assurance
mechanisms in cloud storage services. One of the central
arguments is that data geolocation affects its confidentiality
and privacy status. Similarly, [3]–[7] mention concerns – such
as compliance requirements – about the geolocation of data in
cloud computing environments in general and Infrastructure-
as-a-Service (IaaS) in particular.
Calls for legal mitigation of issues related to data location
in the cloud involve regulating cloud storage services through
binding inter-government regulations [4]. However, this in only
part of the solution, since agreements can be covertly breached
– sometimes long before this fact is revealed to other parties.
Recent innovations in data center design – such as ‘modular
data centres’ – improve the mobility of data centres. A central
component of modular data centres are the standardized ISO
6346 weatherproof containers, capable of housing thousands
of servers and necessary related components. This allows data
center modules to be easily moved across large distances
using standard transportation means. The idea was originally
described in [8] and widely adopted since then. This approach
differs from the traditional, static data centre architecture and
along with advances in distributed storage systems architecture
highlights the necessity to consider the geolocation of hosts
when transferring data to a cloud storage provider.
Any practical solution for protection of data in cloud
environments must consider its impact on functionality – a
major driving force for adoption of cloud computing – such
that e.g. distributed data processing capabilities are minimally
affected. We propose a solution that combines geolocation
data and trusted computing principles to allow data to be
processed and transferred in plaintext only to geolocations
approved by the data owner, without affecting data processing
capabilities of distributed data stores. We present a prototype
implementation based on Swift, a known distributed object
storage system [9].
A. Contribution
Our contribution is as follows. First, we describe a protocol
to securely store location information on cloud host platforms
and later use this information to ensure that data is only avail-
able in plaintext on platforms that are placed in geolocations
sanctioned by the data owner. Second, we provide a detailed
implementation description of the above protocol, based on a
popular cloud operating system and a known distributed object
storage. Finally, we provide a security analysis of the chain of
trust that allows to seal data to a given platform state extended
to include the geolocation of the platform.
B. Organization
In § II we provide an overview of the related work
that addresses data geolocation and data protection in cloud
storage. We continue by defining the important terms in § III
and presenting the system model in § IV. We present the
protocol in § V, the detailed implementation in § VI and the
security analysis in § VII. The prototype evaluation results are
presented in § VIII, followed by a conclusion in § IX.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Related work on the topic has predominantly focused on
establishing the fact that a certain piece of data is stored in a
certain location, ignoring any potential replicas.
The problem of “data sovereignty”, defined as “establishing
data location at a granularity sufficient for placing it within
the borders of a nation-state” was first introduced in [6].
The proposed solution combines provable data possession
(PDP) schemes with a network-delay based protocol for data
geolocation, in order to get a proof of the fact that the data is
located in the respective data centre. This early paper lacks
a specific adversary model and describes only a high-level
solution.
In a follow-up, Gondree and Peterson propose a
“constraints-based data geolocation” solution to determine the
location of data and “bind” it to specific locations1 [7]. The
adversary model assumes an economically rational adversary
aiming to reduce costs through data migration in spite of
contractual agreements. The protocol assumes an initial model
building stage, where landmarks (L) throughout the analysed
geographical region each build a latency-distance estimation
model. Using this model, each landmark issues PDP challenges
to the storage and generates a circular constraint of a radius
centred on L. The geolocation step of the protocol uses the
intersection of geolocation constraints to determine the region
where the data resides. The solution suffers from a series of
limitations: it requires a set of landmarks close to the data cen-
tres of the cloud service provider; incorrectly assumes that the
cloud service provider does not have dedicated communication
channels between its data centres and finally, does not discuss
location-based storage protection and rather just verifies that a
certain file is placed on a given host.
The authors of [10] outline some ideas regarding the use
of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) on server platforms in
the context of data location in cloud networks. The solution
assumes that the identity of the server’s TPM is stored along
with the server’s geographical position by the Certificate
Authority and retrieved when needed. The solution further
assumes a “Location verification and integrity check“ module
implemented in a hypervisor and suggests a two-phase pro-
tocol: the initialization phase includes remote attestation of
the host and verification of its location; the verification phase
includes a protocol to confirm the identity of the host based on
communication with the TPM deployed on it. This solution is
similar to our approach in the use of TPM as a hardware root
of trust; however, it assumes that verification of the location is
done through administrative methods, i.e. costly physical visit
of the facilities. Furthermore, the paper does not describe any
implementation results.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has described a proof of concept implementation for trusted
geolocation in the cloud [5]. The proof of concept uses a
combination of trusted computing, Intel Trusted Execution
Technology (TXT) and a set of manual audit steps to verify
and apply data location policies. The protocol establishes an
automated hardware root of trust – defined as “inherently
1Binding is here used in the sense of detecting occurrences of data
misplacement, rather than data binding in the meaning common in trusted
computing
trusted combination of hardware and firmware that maintains
the integrity of the geolocation information and the platform”,
in order to manage geolocation restrictions for hosts within
an infrastructure cloud platform. The solution assumes that
geolocation information is provisioned to the platform via an
out-of-band mechanism and – along with platform metadata
– stored in the TPM. This information is later accessed in
order to verify the integrity of the host and the location
of the platform. Similar to both our approach and [10],
the use of TPM for platform identification offers a reliable,
hardware-based root of trust. The solution in [5] assumes
remote platform attestation – including location data – in order
to establish the trustworthiness of the platform, which is a
significant improvement compared to earlier work. However,
we see several limitations of this approach and address them
in this paper.
First, the protocol in [5] does not provide any cryptographic
protection of data; rather, data placement is scheduled based
on placement policies and thus data confidentiality depends
on the correctness of the location policy. We believe this
approach does not protect data from accidental or malicious
policy misconfiguration, in which case plaintext data could be
scheduled to an untrusted host. We address this by requiring
that all uploaded client data is confidentiality and integrity
protected and is only stored in plaintext in the jurisdictions
defined by the user, a property achieved by performing remote
attestation of the storage hosts and sealing the confidentiality
and integrity protection keys to the platforms with a correct
configuration.
Second, [5] assumes out-of-band provisioning of geolocation
data to the storage hosts, without further clarification of the
data format and delivery mechanisms. In this paper, we provide
a detailed description of the format of data required for
the geolocation of storage hosts in an infrastructure cloud.
Furthermore, we address the question of secure out-of-band
geolocation data delivery to storage hosts and also suggest a
complementary geolocation acquisition model using dedicated
GPS receivers.
Third, [5] does not describe a mechanism to re-provision
geolocation tags and thus does not hold in the case of mod-
ular data centres mentioned in § I. Our proposed solution –
which assumes a distributed geolocation information acqui-
sition model – holds even in the cases when data hosts are
relocated.
In [11] the authors discuss principles of domain-based stor-
age protection in public infrastructure clouds. The principles
outlined in the paper associate all objects stored in the IaaS
cloud with explicit storage domains. A storage domain in this
context corresponds to an organization or administrative unit
that uses public cloud services (including the storage service)
offered by the provider. All data in a single domain is protected
with the same storage protection master key, the domain key.
The paper further suggests that at guest VM launch, it is se-
curely associated with a particular storage domain throughout
its lifetime. Keys used for data encryption, decryption, integrity
protection and verification in a single domain are derived by an
external, trusted third party (TTP ). We extend this protocol to
include information about the geographical placement of data.
We redefine the concept of “administrative domain” in [11]
to also include a certain geographical area corresponding to a
jurisdiction.
Use of GPS signals in the context of data centres has
been described in [12], where GPS and atomic clocks are
used for time synchronization in order to implement externally-
consistent distributed transactions.
Besides addressing the limitations of the above papers,
our solution discusses cloud data storage protection including
replicas of the data scattered throughout the distributed data
store, something which – to the best of our knowledge – has
not been done earlier.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definitions
IaaS (cloud) platform (IP): We assume an IaaS platform
model as defined by NIST in [13], which offers “processing,
storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources
where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary soft-
ware, which can include operating systems and applications”;
according to the same definition, users do not have control over
the underlying infrastructure. IaaS platforms in this paper are
assumed to include a large data store distributed over several
data centres in distinct geographical areas.
User (U ): Users are capable to access (read and write) data
objects in the cloud data store. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} be the
set of all users of a certain IP . Then, the set of all data objects
that a certain user u1 owns is denoted f1 =
{
f11 , . . . , f
1
n
}
.
Cloud Service Provider (CSP ): We refer to a CSP as an
entity that operates an IP and makes it available for users.
The CSP includes both the case when the respective entity
owns and physically manages its data centres and the case
when an IP is deployed on computing resources provided by
a third party supplier. The IP operated by the CSP may be
deployed throughout arbitrarily many data centres.
Geolocation (L): We refer to a geolocation cell L as
a bounding area (e.g. country, region, territory, etc.) defined
by a set of location points represented by their latitude and
longitude (li = lati, loni) such that L = {l1, l2, ...ln}. Each li
represents the location of an IP in the data centre; every data
centre is associated with at most one L and no two geolocation
cells overlap.
Jurisdiction (J ): We refer to a jurisdiction as “the territory
or sphere of activity over which the legal authority of a court or
other institution extends” [14]. Let Ji, Jj be two jurisdictions
with incompatible data protection regulations. Consider a user
u1 that operates on privacy-sensitive data and uses the services
of a CSP with data centres present in both Ji and Jj . For
compliance reasons, u1 may only process the data in Ji and
faces penalties if data is processed or stored in plaintext in
Jj2. A valid jurisdiction is a non-empty set of Ls.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM ): A TPM is a tamper-
evident hardware cryptographic coprocessor built according to
the specifications of the Trusted Computing Group [16]. In
this work, we assume that all IaaS hosts underlying the IP are
equipped with a TPM v1.2 chip. An active TPM records the
software state of the platform at boot time and stores it in its
platform configuration registers (PCRs) as a list of hashes. A
2Operating on encrypted text currently allows an impractically restricted set
of operations [15]
TPM enables data protection by securely maintaining crypto-
graphic keys, as well as through the set of functions it exposes.
The bind and seal functions are particularly relevant for the
proposed solution. According to [16], a message encrypted
(“bound”) using a particular TPM ’s public key is decryptable
only by using the private key of the same TPM . Sealing
is a special case of binding, where the encrypted messages
produced through binding are only decryptable in a certain
platform state (defined by the PCR values). This ensures that an
encrypted message can only be decrypted by a platform found
in a certain prescribed state. We refer to [16] for a detailed
coverage of the bind and seal operations.
Trusted Third Party (TTP ): The TTP is an entity which is
trusted by the community and plays a key role in our protocol.
The TTP is able to communicate with components deployed
on compute hosts to exchange integrity attestation information,
authentication tokens and cryptographic keys. In addition,
the TTP can attest platform integrity based on the integrity
attestation quotes provided by the TPM on the respective
compute hosts, as well as seal data to a trusted configuration
of the hosts. Finally, the TTP can verify the authenticity of a
client as well as perform necessary cryptographic operations.
Trusted Platform (TP ): In this paper, we define trusted
platforms as server platforms the integrity and trusted state of
which has been attested by the TTP . The trusted platforms of
an IP comprise the Trusted Computing Pool (T ), introduced
in [5], that is the collection of trusted platforms in a certain
IaaS cloud platform.
B. Adversary model
We share the adversary model with [17], [18] which assume
that privileged access rights can be maliciously used by CSP
remote system administrators (Ar). This scenario assumes that
Ar can log in remotely to any host of the CSP and obtain root
access. However, in this model Ar does not have physical
access to the hosts. We add a geolocation aspect to the security
model: u1 requires assurance that her data is not stored or
processed in plaintext outside jurisdiction Ji. The CSP may
experience intermittent errors and has an incentive to optimize
costs by placing or processing data in a different jurisdiction,
e.g. Jj . We explicitly exclude Denial-of-Service attacks from
our model, since we assume an economically rational CSP
interested in maximizing its profits by continuing to provide
services to users.
C. Problem Statement
Assume an authorized user u1 writes a file f1 to the storage
provided by CSP . A trusted distributed storage system shall
then satisfy the following properties:
1) The file f1, as well as its replicas, must only be stored
and processed in plaintext in the set of jurisdictions
Ji defined by u1.
2) The allowed jurisdictions Ji must be specified once,
when f1 is first written to the distributed storage. It
shall be impossible for an adversary to subsequently
change the association between f1 and the set of
allowed jurisdictions.
3) Let f ′1 be a file derived from a processing operation
on file f1. The system shall make sure that f ′1 inherits
all the jurisdiction restrictions from f1;
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a public IP managed by a CSP where
multiple users lease processing and storage capacity. To benefit
from properties such as increased availability, scale flexibility
and use of distributed data processing algorithms, data is stored
in distributed data stores. This is a common system model in
modern infrastructures (including infrastructure clouds) that
deal with massive amounts of data and allow data to be
reliably stored, replicated and retrieved within a very short
time. Examples of such systems are Google BigTable [19],
Amazon Dynamo [20], Windows Azure [21], etc. Current
distributed data stores store redundant replicas (often even-
tually synchonized) of data on different hosts, thus offering
scalability and intra-data center resilience to hardware failures.
From a geographical point of view, a distributed storage is
either deployed within one data center (and hence in one
jurisdiction), or spans several data centres (and possibly several
jurisdictions). In the latter case, in order to separate data that
is subject to conflicting regulations, users may choose to store
the data in two or more distinct IaaS platforms IP1 and
IP2 – as for example in the case of Amazon Govcloud [22].
However, this restricts geographic redundancy and reduces
service availability guarantees. Another possibility is to deploy
distributed storage systems across data centres – there are
efforts towards this both in academic research ( [23]–[25]) and
industry implementation3. Emerging capabilities of distributed
data stores add geographical redundancy, such that the data
store is deployed across geographically distinct data centres
and offers inter-data center redundancy on a global scale while
maintaining the eventual synchrony of data. For simplicity, we
assume a specific subtype of distributed data stores, namely
distributed object storages depicted in Fig. 1 and described in
§ IV-A.
According to the model, the domain of the CSP includes
the IaaS cloud platform components, the hypervisor, as well
as the underlying hardware.
A. Distributed object storage
We assume an object storage capable of storing binary
objects (similar to Amazon S3) which can be geographically
distributed across multiple data centres4. Below, we provide
a simplified description of some important components of a
distributed object storage (see Fig. 1).
The API endpoint is the public API of the object storage.
Upon each request, the proxy server looks up the location
of the accounts or objects in the ring, routes requests and
performs error handling.
The ring is a logical structure implemented a distributed
hash table that maps the names of stored entities to their physi-
cal location. Rings maintain the mapping using zones, devices,
3See for example issue HDSF-1432, discussing implementation of HDSF
deployment across data centres, https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HDFS-
1432
4While this is a fairly recent development, such distributed object storages
already exist; see for example https://github.com/openstack/swift/blob/master/
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Fig. 1. Sketch of a distributed object storage
partitions and replicas. Partitions have a replication degree n
and their locations are stored in the mapping maintained by the
ring. Data can be isolated using the zones of the ring, where
each zone can be a data center, switch, cabinet, server or drive.
In this model, we assume that each zone is a geographically
distinct data centre.
Object server is a simple binary large object storage
that can store, retrieve and delete objects on local devices.
The object meta data is stored in the extended file attributes
(otherwise known as “xattrs”).
Replicators maintain state consistency in the face of net-
work or node failures. This is done by comparing data with
each remote copy to ensure freshness. Replication updates are
push-based (rsync file replication to peers).
V. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We describe a mechanism used by IP hosts to acquire their
geographical location – mapped to a geolocation cell (L) – and
securely store it in TPM PCR{15}. Next, we present a protocol
that allows the data owner to specify the list of geolocation
cells where data is stored (or processed) in plaintext (Fig. 5),
relying on the TPM functionality to seal the data decryption
key to the state of PCR{0− 7, 15}.
A. Geolocation
The proposed solution is based on sealing user data to a
set of geolocation cells, making plaintext data only available
to hosts physically placed in the jurisdiction authorized by
the user. This requires extending [26] the platform geolocation
cell value L to a dedicated TPM register during platform boot
(we use PCR{15}). The geolocation cell value is obtained
through reverse geocoding, which is the process of matching a
location point with an administrative unit, e.g. country, region,
municipality, etc. For a detailed review of the concept, see
[27] 5.
5A sample call to the OpenSteet Map API – http://nominatim.
openstreetmap.org/reverse?format=xml&lat=59.406318&lon=17.947&zoom=
12&addressdetails=1 – produces the reply presented in Fig. 2
1 <r e v e r s e g e o c o d e t imes t amp =”Thu , 22 May
14 08 : 1 7 : 1 7 +0000 ”>
2 <a d d r e s s p a r t s>
3 <su bu rb>K i s t a< / s ub u r b>
4 <c i t y>Stockholm< / c i t y>
5 <co un ty>Stockho lms l a n< / c ou n t y>
6 < s t a t e>Stockho lms l a n< / s t a t e>
7 <c o u n t r y>Sweden< / c o u n t r y>
8 <c o u n t r y c o d e>se< / c o u n t r y c o d e>
9 < / a d d r e s s p a r t s>
10 < / r e v e r s e g e o c o d e>
Fig. 2. Sample reverse geocoding result
In our example, reverse geocoding maps any given location
point li to a geolocation cell L. One approach to supply
geolocation cell information to the platform is through out-of-
band provisioning at an earlier stage and store it in the TPM,
as suggested in [5]. However, such out-of-band provisioning
can be prone to administrator error or misuse, therefore we
propose to report L to the TPM through an isolated daemon
process (D), and introduce two models for such a daemon
to obtain L. The first model (presented in Fig. 3) reuses the
concept of “geolocation master nodes” described in [12], where
certain hosts are equipped with GPS receivers and dedicated
antennas, and are physically separated to reduce the effect of
antenna failures, radio interference and spoofing. We assume
that the master geolocaton node is previously attested and
therefore trusted. The geolocation master node identifies its
location point li and uses a local geocoding database to map
li to a geolocation cell L. At boot time, D running on the
storage hosts obtains L from the geolocation master and stores
it in the TPM register. Note that this approach does not rule
out pre-configuring geolocation cell information out-of-band,
as suggested in [5], but reduces the amount of administrative
operations required on IP and eliminates a potential attack
vector. In the second model, process D running on the storage
host, uses a navigation device natively attached to the host’s
motherboard to obtain its location point li; next, D uses a local
geocoding database to map li to a geolocation cell L; finally,
it extends L into the TPM register (see § III-A). While the
feasibility of this model depends on the particular data centre
architecture, it complements the approach described in model
1 without additional assumptions. We have chosen this latter
approach for the rest of the paper, given the wider applications
it enables for mobile platforms equipped with a hardware
root of trust. The functionality of D is explained below and
presented in Algorithm 1.
In the first step of the protocol, the TTP uses the PCR
aggregate of a particular trusted host platform TP1 to create
an asymmetric TPM key pair SealKey, which is used to seal
data to TP1 in geolocation cell LA. Consequently, TPM only
releases the private SealKey if the current PCR values of
TP1 match the ones specified in the PCR aggregate used in
the key creation. For performance reasons, a session key K –
encrypted with the SealKey – is used for data encryption and
decryption operations.
The runtime state of the platform with respect to its identity
TP1 and location LA is represented by PCR{0 − 7} and
PCR{15} respectively. These PCRs are populated with values
at platform boot time. While the platform state of TP1 is
input : Navigation Device Port
output: Geolocation cell value hash in TPM PCR 15
initialization: enable GPS, configure GPS Port;
call:fork() to daemonize;
while satellites tracked < 4 do
Command: get GPGGA data from Navigation
Device;
end
call:geolocationcell a← ReverseGeocode(lat, lon);
call:Ha ← SHA1(geolocationcell a);
call:Hexp ← Rebuild Chain(Ha, Hdef );
call:Hcur ← TPM ReadPCR(15);
if Hcur 6= Hexp then
call:TPM Extend (Ha);
end
sleep(time);
Algorithm 1: Location Reporting Daemon
TPM
TPM TPM
GPS
TPMGPS TPMGPS
Storage/processing hosts
Geolocation
Master
Dedicated GPS 
antenna
MODEL 1: Geolocation master with
                 dedicated GPS antenna
MODEL 2: Geolocation devices 
                mounted on motherboard
Geolocation
Information
collected by
the secure 
daemon process
Hosts determine their own
 location using geolocation 
 devices mounted on the 
 motherboard
A secure daemon process 
extends the values in the 
TPM PRCs
Fig. 3. Geolocation cell reporting to TPM
reported by the TCG-compliant BIOS and the bootloader
in PCR{0 − 7}, we implement a component D that runs
as a daemon process to report the platform location LA to
PCR{15}. Component D is built with minimal functionality:
read the navigation device port for location data and extend
it to PCR{15}. The navigation device is enabled at boot time
and immediately starts tracking satellites. After a valid location
fix is found and the minimum number of required satellites
are located6, D translates – through reverse geocoding – the
location point li to the corresponding geolocation cell (i.e. La).
Next, the geolocation cell value verification follows. De-
note the default value of PCR{15} at boot time by Hdef 7. D
computes the SHA-18 hash (Ha) of La and rebuilds the hash
chain for PCR{15}: Hdef extended by Ha yields the expected
value for PCR{15}, denoted Hexp = Hdef ||Ha. Next, D
compares Hexp with Hcur, the current value in PCR{15}. If
Hexp 6= Hcur, then Ha supersedes Hcur and is extended to
6A connection to 3 satellites suffices to provide a location point on Earth
but a minimum of 4 satellites provides better accuracy.
7The value of PCR{15} after TPM_Startup is 0, as specified in [16].
8The choice of SHA-1 is imposed by the TPM v1.2 specifications, see [16]
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Fig. 4. Process model: data placement with geolocation cell restrictions
PCR{15}; otherwise, no action is taken. D runs as a privileged
process and performs this operation recurrently. As a result,
during the first check PCR{15} will be extended with the hash
value Ha of the current geolocation cell La and will maintain
this value unless platform is relocated to a different geolocation
cell, Lb. In that case, Lb results in a new hash value Hb which
supersedes Hcur and – according to the procedure above – is
extended to PCR{15}, making SealKey unavailable on the
respective platform.
Thus, data encrypted with SealKey is only available in
plaintext to TP1 located in La, i.e. preventing access to plain-
text data to hosts located outside the authorized jurisdictions.
SealKey remains available in the face of restarts, as long as
the host is rebooted in the same, trusted state and geolocation
cell. Implementation details are provided in §VI.
B. Storage Protection Protocol
We propose the following protocol to ensure that data
is available for processing and storage in plaintext only on
storage hosts deployed in a user-approved jurisdiction. A high-
level model of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 4 and a detailed
message flow is presented in Fig. 5. For the purposes of
the protocol, we assume that the user u1 knows the public
key of the TTP. We further assume that u1 can generate a
high-entropy symmetric key K and encrypt own data prior to
uploading them to the distributed object storage. Considering
the adversary model described in § III-B, we do not explicitly
include data integrity protection in the following protocol.
However, if integrity of the data is a requirement, the protocol
can be easily extended to include it. Finally, we assume that
encrypted data is indistinguishable from random noise and
encrypted replicas of data may be stored without any legal
consequences in any jurisdiction.
Protocol description follows; corresponding steps of the
protocol and the message flow are also presented in Fig. 5.
1) User u1 uploads though the API endpoint the en-
crypted data (denoted by E(P,K)), along with a
signed user token containing a description of the
location policy constraints – represented by a list
of geolocation cells, as shown in Fig. 6 – and the
:User :API Endnode :TTP :Host: ser : PI ndnode : P : ost
1. Write(E(P,K))
2. Policy mask()
TJi
3. Write data(TJi , E(P,K))
ok
4. Attest hosts(TJi )
5a. Attest()
5b. Seal(K)
6. E(P,K), K
P
Fig. 5. Protocol message flow: data placement with geolocation cell
restrictions.
symmetric key K, encrypted with TTPs public key.
Thus, K can be accessed in plaintext only by the TTP
(and u1 who has generated it).
2) The API endpoint applies the provided location policy
to determine the set of hosts that are allowed –
according to the policy specified by u1 in the token
– to store (or process) the uploaded data in plaintext.
Denote this set by TJi .
3) The API endpoint writes E(P,K) to the hosts in TJi
and returns a write confirmation to the user;
4) The API endpoint forwards to the TTP the encrypted
user token and the list in TJi .
5) The TTP verifies the authenticity of the user token,
performs a remote attestation of the hosts in TJi to
verify their software platform state and confirm the
claimed location in jurisdiction Ji, decrypts K and
seals it to the trusted configuration of the hosts in
TJi ;
6) The hosts in TJi decrypt E(P,K) and use plaintext
data (P ) for storage or processing.
7) When requested by user or by the replicator com-
ponent for synchronization, the storage hosts encrypt
data with the same key K and send E(P,K) to the
requester (for clarity, we have omitted this step from
figures 4, 5).
Note that user u1 is free to specify either a single or more
geolocation cells. The situation when reverse geocoding maps
the location point to a wrong geolocation cell is unlikely,
and reoccurring errors can be corrected by redefining the
boundaries of the respective geolocation cells.
1 <? xml v e r s i o n =” 1 . 0 ” e n c o d i n g =”UTF−8” ?>
2 <L o c a t i o n P o l i c y>
3 <P o l i c y I D>c r e d : i d< / P o l i c y I D>
4 <Timestamp>1289123342< / Timestamp>
5 <G e o c e l l L i s t>
6 <G e o c e l l>
7 <L o c a t i o n>suburb :name< / L o c a t i o n>
8 <L o c a t i o n>c i t y : n a m e< / L o c a t i o n>
9 <L o c a t i o n>coun ty :name< / L o c a t i o n>
10 <L o c a t i o n>s t a t e : n a m e< / L o c a t i o n>
11 <L o c a t i o n>c o u n t r y : n a m e< / L o c a t i o n>
12 <G e o c e l l>
13 < / G e o c e l l L i s t>
14 < / L o c a t i o n P o l i c y>
Fig. 6. Location policy for a data object
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
In order to test the validity of the above protocol, we have
implemented it using the Swift distributed object storage [9].
Release 1.9.0 of the Swift distributed object storage intro-
duced support for global clusters. This includes capabilities
for a separate replication network and read/write affinity con-
figuration, which combined enable Swift to run as a single
cluster over a wider geographic area, explicitly addressing
our assumption about geographically distributed data stores. In
addition, Swift provides capabilities to define storage policies
based on certain attributes of the storage hosts. For this
prototype, we have implemented a policy functionality and
configured our Swift deployment to only store the encrypted
data on the hosts in a certain jurisdiction Ji. Hosts with the
correct location information were able to unseal the encryption
key when needed. A modification of the object storage used
the unsealed encryption key to decrypt the data before it
was written to the node, thus only storing plaintext data on
authorized hosts. However, once a file is requested from the
respective object storage (by the replicator component for
container synchronization, or by the API endpoint to be server
to the client), it is encrypted with the same encryption key.
We revisit the requirements outlined in § III-C. In protocol
context, we identify two classes of objects: (i) objects uploaded
or created by the data owner; (ii) object replicas created by
the storage for operational purposes. The objects in class (i)
are encrypted by the data owner and the decryption key is
made available – according to the above protocol – only to
TP located in the jurisdiction prescribed by the data owner.
Objects in class (ii) are maintained encrypted and placed on
storage hosts at the discretion of the object storage.
For the second requirement, the location policy specified
by the object owner enumerates the geolocation cells where
objects may be places in plaintext. The TTP will only seal
the encryption key on TP that are located in the allowed
jurisdiction; the adversary, as defined in the adversary model
above, can not force the TTP to seal the encryption key on
other hosts.
For the third requirement, note that only storage nodes
running on TP have access to the plaintext data for storage
and processing. All of the data (f ′1) derived through processing
will be protected with the same symmetric encryption key prior
to being copied by the replicators to other hosts in the ring. In
this way, f ′1 will inherit the same locations policy: only TP
placed in the jurisdiction specified by the owner of object f1
will have access to the encryption key.
In our implementation, we have used a Lenovo
Thinkpad T430s host which in a standard configuration
has a navigation device Ericsson H5321 gw Mobile
Broadband GPS attached to the motherboard on a PCIe
slot. Navigation devices are widely deployed on mobile plat-
forms (including laptops), and can be easily added to other
types of platforms which do not have them pre-installed. Our
test host runs Linux (CentOS 6.4) which assigns device
name /dev/ttyACM2 to the navigation device according to
the default udev rule9. In order to have a persistent device
name and to ensure that D reads location data from an
authentic source, we define a custom udev rule (shown in
listing 7) – protected by including it in the TCB – and
place it in /etc/udev/rules.d/, such that whenever the
navigation device is switched on, a persistent symbolic link
/dev/navigation_device is created and D is started.
1 ATTRS{m o d a l i a s }==” usb:v0B . . . . i p01 ” ,
2 ATTRS{ i n t e r f a c e }==” E r i c s s o n H5321 GPS” ,
3 SYMLINK+=” n a v i g a t i o n d e v i c e ” ,
4 RUN+=/ u s r / b i n / l o c a t i o n d a e m o n
Fig. 7. 10-navigation-device.rules
Given the limitations of GPS signal receivers, placing such
receivers on individual platforms might not be a viable solution
in many cases, such as data centres located underground or
placed in sealed metal containers, as described in [8]. As
an alternative, we apply the solution described in [12] and
presented in Fig. 3, where a geolocation master server with
a dedicated GPS antenna provides signed geolocation cell
information to all other hosts in the cluster (e.g. a rack). In this
case, the protocol would need to also include the attestation of
this dedicated geolocation master. Due to space limitations, we
omit the description of these alternative, yet justified scenarios.
For reverse geocoding, we have used the OpenStreet
Maps dataset and the API provided by the OpenStreet Maps
project10. While the size of the complete planet data set is
significant (in the range of 400 G), a filtered version containing
only country information, produced using a tool such as
Osmfilter11, is significantly smaller – 187 kb – and can be
placed on each IP host and included in the TCB.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
GPS signal security is an important aspect for the presented
solution and is an active research topic [28]–[30]. Forays into
GPS signal security are out of the scope of this paper and for
the purposes of the solution we assume that the setup is capable
to detect GPS spoofing attempts, as described in [28], [30].
However, we consider GPS security at application level, to
ensure that daemon D is not tampered and it reads the location
data from an interface which is connected to a valid, physical
9https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/hotplug/udev/udev.html
10http://planet.openstreetmap.org/, http://nominatim.openstreetmap.org/
11http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Osmfilter
navigation device. The integrity of D is protected by including
it in the TCB; moreover, in order to securely and persistently
bind the navigation device to a navigation interface, we create
a custom udev rule, which is also protected by including
it in the TCB. Udev rules are loaded by the Linux kernel
during the first boot stages and are later used by the udev
daemon (i.e. udevd which is also a part of TCB) to assign
a device name (e.g. /dev/navigation_device) when
a uevent is triggered by that device (e.g. device attached,
removed, enabled, disabled, etc.). Including D, udevd service
and udev rules into the TCB prevents their modification under
the adversarial model described in (§ III-B).
When it comes to storage and processing of data in the
cloud storage, in § V we propose a protocol to both store and
process data in plaintext only on trusted hosts in a certain
jurisdiction chosen by the user. In both cases, we rely on the
remote attestation of hosts (the procedure is described in [18]),
expanded with information about the geographical position of
the host. The result is, that a host whose platform state has
changed through either software modification or change of
physical location will not be able to obtain the plaintext version
of user data. An adversary in our model might have two goals
– obtain the plaintext version of user data or process data in
plaintext in a jurisdiction that is not acceptable by the client,
in order to reduce operational costs. In both cases, given the
physical security of the hosts, confidentiality protection keys
will not be made available in case of either a change of the
boot aggregate (PCR {0 − 7}) or the geographical position
of the host PCR{15}. Here it is worth mentioning that host
physical security and change in the geographical position of the
platform are not mutually exclusive – considering the example
of the modular data centres above, a sealed container with
intact platforms may be transferred to a different jurisdiction
without affecting the integrity of the platforms.
VIII. PERFORMANCE
In our experiments, the average time for a commodity GPS
receiver from a “cold” start to acquire at least 4 satellites was
97.5 seconds (the GPS device was reset between measurements
using the command AT*E2RESET). The GPS device main-
tained a “hot” start between reboots and thus could acquire at
least 4 satellites immediately after initialization12. Important
to note, according to the protocol, acquiring satellites is only
necessary at platform boot and does not affect subsequent data
access time, we thus exclude this factor from the following
performance assessment.
Given the steps of the protocol and considering that the
TPM is a relatively slow device, it is to be expected that the
largest contributors to the performance impact are the TPM
unseal operation and most importantly the data encryption and
decryption operations. The TPM unseal operation to obtain
the symmetric encryption key, is also a one-time operation,
performed once when the respective storage hosts process the
data. Once the decryption key is unsealed, it is maintained
in memory and used for decryption and encryption of the
respective data. In our experiments, the average duration of
12Cold Start: The receiver must download almanac and ephemeris in-
formation to achieve a position fix. Hot Start: A hot start occurs when a
receiver has up-to-date almanac and ephemeris information. http://www.ni.
com/white-paper/7189/en/
the unseal operation was 1.23 s. To evaluate the performance
of the protocol, we have measured the execution time of a PUT
operation using file sizes between 1 and 100 M.
Fig. 8. Performance measurements for PUT operations to Swift distributed
object store, with and without the data placement protocol
The results – also presented in Fig. 8 – showed that
encrypting objects prior to writing to the object storage implies
a relatively small overhead (∼25%) which increases linearly
with the size of the file. The initial spike in the graph is due to
the relatively long time to unseal the SealKey. As it is clearly
visible, this does not affect the following PUT operations.
The above results may vary, depending primarily on the
configured number of replicas and consistency policy. The
optimal configuration is use case and deployment architecture
specific, and is thus out of the scope of this paper.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a solution to control the ge-
ographic location of plaintext data placed and processed in
Infrastructure-as-a-Service deployments. Our analysis of the
related work reveals the need to advance beyond verifying
that certain data is placed in a certain location. We address
this issue and propose several solutions on device, operating
system, and object storage platform levels to ensure that data
is only stored and processed in plaintext in the jurisdiction
designated by the data owner. We use trusted computing
protocols in order to perform remote attestation of storage and
processing hosts, as well as to seal cryptographic material to
trusted platforms of the hosts and their geolocation, which we
obtain from either a commercial off the shelf device on the
host motherboard or a dedicated geolocation master node. On
the IaaS level, we leverage the trusted state of the platform
to decrypt, store and process user data in plaintext only on
hosts located in a certain jurisdiction specified by the user
prior to upload. Our performance tests have demonstrated the
feasibility of the proposed approach; further improvements in
CPU architectures are expected to reduce the overhead induced
by the data encryption stages of the algorithm. Future work
includes refinement of the proposed geolocation cell model,
integration of platform attestation with kernel-level mandatory
access control policies as well as minimization and eventual
elimination of the TTP, which would allow us to consider
stronger adversary models.
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